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The paper explores the reputational damages 
suffered by major and minor rating agencies as a 
consequence of the subprime crisis. The analysis is 
carried out through a standard event standard 
methodology on a sample of 1821 rating actions 
during the period November 2003 - November 2013. 
The evidence shows a lower market reaction to 
rating actions, especially when the evaluation is far 
away from the threshold between investment and 
speculative grade. 
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1. Introductioni 
 
After the so-called subprime crisis, one of the main scapegoats identified by academicians 
and supervising authorities were the rating agencies. In the aftermath of the crisis, various 
critical analysis and a few trials focused on ascertaining the responsibilities of credit rating 
agencies (CRAs) and the roots of a disastrous performance that did not have equals in 
their history.  
 
In this paper we want to gauge the extension of the reputational damage suffered by CRAs 
as a consequence of these events, by looking at the market‟s reaction to their rating 
announcements. We expect to find a lower market impact of rating actions after the crisis, 
due to a loss of trust in the neutrality and reliability of the rating evaluations. In other 
words, we expect the market to believe less blindly and, consequently, to react less 
strongly to rating agencies‟ credit opinions. In particular, we expect the phenomenon to be 
stronger when the certification role is less relevant and, thus, the regulation-induced 
trading is thinner.ii  
 
This paper adds to previous literature on the topic by specifically exploring the effect of the 
subprime crisis on the credibility of rating agencies. To our knowledge the question hasn‟t 
yet been explored thoroughly. Furthermore, we carry out a comparison between major and 
minor rating agencies, whereas most academic research focused on the major players i.e. 
Moody‟s, Standard and Poor‟s and Fitch.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, we briefly review the literature 
concerning rating agencies and their role in the financial markets. Then, we describe the 
size and the features of the sample used in the analysis. In the fourth paragraph we detail 
the methodology used and we comment on the expected sign of the independent variables 
included in econometric analysis. In the fifth paragraph we present our findings, We first 
focus on the two separate sub-samples of rating actions issued by major and minor 
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agencies. We then perform the analysis of the entire sample looking for differences in the 
magnitude of the credibility loss depending on the nature of the rating agency issuing the 
announcement. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
The majority of papers focused on the informative content of rating and aimed at 
measuring abnormal returns in market prices following various types of announcements 
made by agencies. In many empirical works the researchers took into consideration the 
abnormal returns preceding rating actions as well, so as to determine if and to what extent 
the market anticipates the judgments made by the agencies. In most recent works, 
alongside the informative content of rating, their “certification” role is explored. Since many 
laws and regulations – the most prominent example being Basel 2 Agreement – have 
recognized an official role to rating agencies‟ valuations, the crossing of certain thresholds 
affects the behavior of numerous restricted investors who may be forced to sell a 
downgraded security or may regain the right to buy an upgraded one (Steiner et Heinke, 
2001; Micu et al., 2006;  Kiff et al., 2012). In these cases, not only – or, even, not mainly – 
are the abnormal returns a consequence of the information content conveyed by the 
agency, but they are also a by-product of the gatekeeper status granted by the regulatory 
framework (Partnoy, 2006). Many papers also aimed at distinguishing the market impact of 
rating announcements on the basis of the motivation given by the agency (Goh and 
Ederington,1993), the concurrent diffusion of important information by the issuing company 
(Hand et al., 1992), the presence of a review/outlook anticipating the rating action by the 
same agency or any preceding announcement by another agency. Studies also 
differentiate on the basis of the type of the market analyzed, the extension of the event 
windows taken into consideration and the technicalities in the measurement of abnormal 
returns.  
 
Just a few empirical works specifically focused on banks. From a theoretical point of view, 
some researchers maintain that rating actions should be able to convey less information to 
the market when concerning banks, since these financial intermediaries have to comply to 
enhanced transparency requirements and operate within the framework of strict prudential 
supervision (Richards and Deddouche, 1999). The opposite view is expressed by other 
researchers who highlight that authorities in charge of monitoring banks tend to withdraw 
bad news, in fear of creating panic among retail investors. If this is the case, rating 
agencies could disclose information that – even if known by the supervisory authorities – 
have not been adequately diffused to the market. In a way, the authorities‟ reluctance to 
pass on bad news could even amplify the effect of a downgrade on market prices (Gropp 
and Richards, 2001; Steiner and Heinke, 2001).  
 
Our hypothesis is that – all other factors being equal – the subprime crisis has undermined 
the investors‟ trust in agencies‟ announcements. Therefore, we will include in our 
econometric models all factors that previous literature found to be relevant in explaining 
the magnitude of price reaction to rating actions. To test our hypothesis we will add time  
variables accounting for the period when the announcement was made in order to verify if 
the subprime crisis produced a durable effect. 
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3. Sample Description  
 
The sample used in our empirical analysis consists of 1821 rating revisions issued by the 
three major CRAs (Standard & Poor 's, Moody's and Fitch) and by four "minor" CRAs in 
terms of market share (EJR, R&I, DBRS and JCR), during the period November 1st  2003 
– November 1st 2013.  The rating announcements concern a sample of 108 financial 
intermediaries – 43% from Europe, 34% from Asia, 23% from America – extrapolated from 
the STOXX 1800 Index. The analyzed events include downgrading and upgrading, 
confirmations on earlier ratings, insertion in the surveillance list with positive or negative 
watch and outlook. All data have been extracted from the Bloomberg database. 
 
The distribution of the 1821 rating actions by year (Figure 1) and its subdivision into 
groups according to the type of CRAs (Big vs. Non-Big), suggests two conclusions: the 
first one concerns the dynamics which affected the rating actions, the second one 
concerns their composition. The constant increase of rating activities, briefly interrupted in 
2010, indicates an intense information activity carried out by the CRAs. A significant role is 
also played by minor agencies, especially in the last three years. During the period under 
investigation, each issuer has been monitored by an average of 2.28 agencies; 21% of the 
analyzed financial intermediaries exclusively addressed to at least one of the Big Three; 
31.5% were followed only by one or more minor agencies, while 47% of issuers got their 
ratings from both. It can be pointed out that more than half of the issuers has been 
evaluated by the two types of CRAs starting from 2011, possibly under the influence of the 
ESMA guidelines. 
 
Figure 1: Distribution of ratings revisions (November 1st 2003 – November 1st 2013) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
* The number of revisions of the year 2003 is abnormal because the survey takes into consideration only two months, as 
well as in the year 2013 when the events of the last two months are not taken into consideration. 
 
The different alphanumeric characters used by all CRAs were translated into a single 
numerical scale, with the lowest value attributed to the highest grade of creditworthiness 
(AAA = 1; AA with positive watch = 1,75) and the highest value to the worst assessment 
(CC = 20; CC with negative watch = 20,25). This operation enables to compare how credit 
agencies have rated issuers over the years. Considering the average value of the 1595 
ratings issued (outlooks excluded) and divided according to the nature of the agency they 
refer to, it seems that minor CRAs have been more severe in their judgments, with an 
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average rating value higher than the one recorded by major CRAs (Table 1). Minor CRAs‟ 
greater rigor is clear even when the indicator is considered by dividing the period under 
investigation into three sub-periods: the pre-crisis, crisis and post-crisis period. In all the 
three periods, the average value of the ratings assigned by the major agencies is more 
positive than the one issued by minor competitors. Furthermore, if the average rating value 
is disaggregated, it is clear that the greater rigor attributed to minor CRAs is mainly due to 
the EJR credit agency which differs from its competitors for having adopted the 
"subscriber-pay" model. Standard & Poor 's is the rating agency among the Big Three that 
issues the strictest ratings. By restricting the analysis to the issuers judged both by major 
and minor CRAs during the crisis and post-crisis period, the greater severity by EJR and 
Standard & Poor 's is confirmed. 
 
Table 1 – Average ratings value 
  # Obs. 
Average 
rating 
Maximum 
value 
Minimum 
value 
Standard 
deviation 
Big 801 5.94 1 15.25 2.53 
Non Big 794 6.56 2 20 2.79 
Rating actions by period            
Pre-crisis Big 222 4.38 1 10 1.73 
Pre-crisis Non Big 181 4.71 2 10 1.61 
Crisis Big 142 4.99 2 11 1.49 
Crisis Non Big 88 5.36 2.75 9 1.47 
Post-crisis Big 437 7.05 1.25 15.25 2.60 
Post-crisis Non Big 525 7.40 2 20 2.90 
Rating revisions by agency  
    
  
DBRS 180 4.98 2 13 2.11 
Moody's 230 5.21 1 14 2.59 
R&I 249 5.36 3 10 1.37 
JCR 32 5.59 2 9 2.10 
Fitch 217 5.74 2 11 1.98 
S&Ps 354 6.54 2 15.25 2.65 
EJR 333 8.40 3 20 2.92 
 
4. Methodology 
 
In order to evaluate the reputational damage suffered by credit rating agencies we adopt a 
standard event study methodology. We measure the abnormal return for each rating 
change included in our sample in a 3-day event window centered on the announcement 
day [-1;1] using a market model with 500 day as estimation window. Such a short event 
window is in line with our research question, focused on the reputation of rating agencies 
and the information value of their actions. The price drift in the following days and weeks 
may be the result of autonomous analysis performed by investors, even if stimulated by 
the rating change, whereas the immediate return is more strictly dependent on the level of 
faith put in the agency‟s competence.  
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Since we are specifically interested in the magnitude of the price reactions to agencies‟ 
announcement, independently from its sign, we focus on the absolute value of cumulative 
abnormal return adopting an approach similar to Grothe (2013): 
 
           |      |  
 
We perform a multivariate econometric analysis of the 3-day cumulative abnormal returns 
associated to rating actions using the OLS method. As independent variables we consider 
a set of standard factors which proved to be relevant in past empirical work. Table 2 
summarizes the definition and the expected signs of these regressors, in line with the main 
findings of specific literature on the topic. 
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Table 2 - Independent variables included in the econometric analysis – Definition 
and expected sign of the coefficient 
 
Name Definition Expected sign 
VA_CHGNOTCHES 
 
Absolute value of the change in rating level, computed on 
the basis of a numerical conversion of the alpha-numerical 
scale used by CRAs, where the higher rating is equal to 1 
and the lowest is equal to 20. The positive and negative 
watches are equal to -0,25 and +0,25 respectively.  
+ 
CONTAMIN 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the distance between 
to following rating announcements on the same company is 
shorter than 30 days. 
+ 
ANTICIP 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 when a downgrading or 
upgrading are preceded by a watch in the same direction. 
- 
RATING_BORDER 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the last or current 
ratings are between BBB+ and BB- and 0 otherwise. 
+ 
DUMMY_WATCH 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the announcement 
consists in a credit warning instead of a downgrading or 
upgrading. 
+ 
VIX 
Value of the VIX index on the announcement day of the 
rating action. 
+ 
DEVST 
Standard deviation of the daily returns in the 50 working 
days preceding the rating action for the specific stock 
concerned by the announcement. 
+ 
DUMMY_CRISIS 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 for all announcements 
between the 15
th
 September 2008 and the 15
th
 October 
2009. 
? 
DUMMY_POSTCRISIS 
Dummy variable which is equal to 1 for all announcements 
after the 15
th
 October 2009. 
+ 
NOBORDER_POST 
CRISIS 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the announcement 
is in the post crisis period and concerns an issuer that is not 
on the verge of the critical threshold between investment 
and junk grade. 
- 
BORDER_POST CRISIS 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the announcement 
is in the post crisis period and concerns an issuer that is on 
the verge of the critical threshold between investment and 
junk grade. 
? 
DUMMY_BIG  
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the rating action is 
announced by one of the major three CRAs (S&Ps, 
Moody‟s and Fitch). 
- 
DUMMY_EJR 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the rating action is 
announced by EJR. 
+ 
DUMMY_S&P 
Dummy variable that is equal to 1 when the rating action is 
announced by Standard & Poor‟s. 
? 
 
As anticipated in the introduction, our contribution to literature lays not only in the inclusion 
of minor agencies – who are usually neglected – but also in the analysis of the reputational 
damage suffered by the rating industry as a consequence of the subprime crisis. 
 
In order to gauge the reputational damage – and this is the core of our analysis – we 
consider two dummy variables: CRISIS and POST_CRISIS. The first assumes a value 
equal to 1 for all rating actions taking place between the 15th September 2008 and the 15th 
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October 2009; the second has a value equal to 1 for all dates after 16th October 2009 and 
0 elsewhere. These dummies are the main instrument we use to gauge to reputation 
impact of the subprime crisis on rating agencies. The expected sign of the coefficient for 
the DUMMY_CRISIS is uncertain. On one side, after Lehman‟s collapse and the rapid 
downgrading of a huge mass of structured product, the market should have put less trust 
in the judgments of the agencies. On the other hand, during a crisis, the investors tend to 
be more sensitive to any kind of news and especially to bad news. Once the worst of the 
crisis was over, the decrease in level of trust and the consequent lower reactivity of the 
market to the information conveyed by credit rating agencies should be more evident. 
Thus, we expect a negative coefficient for the DUMMY_POSTCRISIS. In particular, we 
expect the phenomenon to manifest itself in a stronger way when the regulatory and 
psychological threshold of the junk level is far away. To test this aspect, we introduce two 
interaction variables accounting for the “borderline” and “not-borderline” status in the post-
crisis period.  
 
The inclusion of minor agencies in the sample of rating actions serves as a confirmation 
and reinforcement for the conclusions we draw. In particular, since their regulatory-driven 
role is less established, the information content of their announcements is potentially less 
blurred. Furthermore, since they were less directly involved in the subprime crisis, any 
credibility loss can be interpreted as a general mistrust towards the rating industry as a 
whole.  
 
5. The Findings 
 
5.1 Analysis of the CARs for the Rating Actions Announced by Moody’s, S&Ps and 
Fitch 
 
As already explained above, we start the analysis from the sub-sample of rating actions 
announced by the three most important agencies – Moody‟s, Standard & Poor‟s and Fitch 
– which were more directly involved in the subprime scandal and which may have suffered 
the greater reputational damage. 
 
Table 3 summarizes the most interesting results of the analysis performed. The first 
analysis makes use of a restricted set of independent variables that are available for all the 
961 rating events. All coefficients have the expected sign, in line with the evidence 
provided by previous literature, and are statistically significant. In particular, the abnormal 
return is positively related to the level of volatility, both at market and security-specific 
level. The DUMMY_POSTCRISIS – which is the core variable for our analysis – displays 
he expected negative sign and the coefficient is significant at the 5% confidence level.  
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Table 3 -  Determinants of the ABS_CAR – Sample Big CRAs 
 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Entire 
sample 
Entire 
sample 
Entire 
sample 
Sub-sample 
CONTAMIN 
=0 
Sub-sample: 
WATCH =1 
C 
-0,1578 
(-0,308) 
-0,314 
(0,5467) 
-0,733 
(-0,919) 
-0,472 
(-0,627) 
0,670 
(0,673) 
VA_CHGNOTHCES   
0,642 
(1,354) 
0,314 
(0,813) 
0,508 
(0,711) 
CONTAMIN   
-0,332 
(-0,704) 
 
-1,652*** 
(-2,649) 
ANTICIP   
-0,472 
(-1,05) 
-0,769* 
(-1,865) 
 
DUMMY_CRISIS 
0,601 
(0,754) 
0,568 
(0,4758) 
0,008 
(0,992) 
0,009 
(0,091) 
-3,599*** 
(-2,50) 
DUMMY_POSTCRISIS 
-0,589** 
(-1,97) 
-0,810*** 
(-2,73) 
   
RATING_BORDER  
1,049*** 
(3,668) 
   
NOBORDER_POSTCRISIS   
-1,515*** 
(-3,647) 
-1,585*** 
(3,24) 
-2,092*** 
(-2,352) 
BORDER_POSTCRISIS   
0,03 
(0,05) 
0,521 
(1,60) 
-0,733 
(-0,713) 
VIX 
0,09*** 
(2,709) 
0,101*** 
(2,875) 
0,113*** 
(2,738) 
0,1068** 
(2,287) 
0,176*** 
(4,604) 
DEVST 
0,502** 
(3.64) 
0,477*** 
(3,54) 
0,529*** 
(3,522) 
0,535*** 
(3,051) 
0,633*** 
(3,718) 
DUMMY_WATCH   
0,557 
(1,44) 
  
Adjusted R2 0,228 0,234 0,236 0,281 0,276 
N. observations 961 961 718 515 243 
The t-stat are reported in brackets under each coefficient. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance. 
* = significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level; ***= significant at 1% level with a two-tailed test.  
 
The second column details the results of an analysis where the set of independent 
variables is a little enriched, keeping the total number of observations to 961. In particular, 
we include the dummy RATING_BORDER that displays the expected positive sign and 
that is strongly significant. Furthermore, the t-stat of the DUMMY_POSTCRISIS increases. 
In the columns (3) to (5), we substitute the DUMMY_POSTCRISIS with two interaction 
factors that allow to distinguish – in the post-crisis period – the effect of rating actions near 
to the borderline between the speculative and investment grade from those concerning 
companies in a “safe zone”. The lack of trust should manifest in a stronger way when there 
is less regulation-induced trading. The results show that the absolute value of abnormal 
return is lower, in the post-crisis period, when the rating is far away from the threshold. On 
the contrary, there is no significant difference in the market reaction between the pre- and 
post-crisis periods when the current rating or the last available rating are near to the 
borderline. The DUMMY_CRISIS remains insignificant, whereas the VIX and DEVST 
coefficient display the expected sign and are strongly significant.  
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Column (3) also includes a larger set of independent variables, which proved to be 
relevant in past empirical works on the topic. Even if all factors present the expected sign, 
their statistical significance is low and the marginal increase in the explicative power of the 
regression, measured by the R-squared, is not sensible.  
 
Column (4) restricts the analysis to the uncontaminated events i.e. the rating actions that 
are not preceded by another agency‟s announcement in the previous 30 days. Comparing 
column (3) and (4), the set of significant variables remains unvaried, but the R-squared of 
the regression increases to 28 per cent.  
 
Finally, column (5) focuses on the credit warnings that in literature are often associated 
with a greater informative content for market participants. The number of available 
observations is 243. In this case, the negative coefficient of the CONTAMIN variable is 
significant and, thus, the credit watches that come soon after other announcements are 
associated to lower abnormal return. Both the DUMMY_CRISIS and 
NOBORDER_POSTCRISIS variables are significant and have the expected negative 
coefficient, signaling a reduced market impact of rating actions compared to the pre-crisis 
period.  
 
In summary our analysis provides evidence in line with the previous literature as far all 
“traditional” variables are concerned. On the side of the credibility loss – the main focus of 
our interest – we can conclude that the major rating agencies have indeed suffered a 
reputation damage as a consequence of the subprime crisis that translates in a weaker 
market reaction to their announcements. This is particularly evident when the crossing of a 
regulatory threshold is not involved and, thus, when there is less market impact from 
restricted investors who are obliged to react independently from their trust in the 
informative content conveyed by the agency.  
 
5.2 Analysis of the CARs for the Rating Actions Announced by the Minor CRAs 
 
We conducted the analysis on the dependent ABS_CAR variable by testing the same 
independent variables used for the sample with the Big Three, in order to determine 
whether the independent variables exert similar effects or if there are any 
discrepancies. The results are detailed in Table 4.  
 
The first set of regressors (1) shows the sign of the coefficients in line with our 
expectations, except in the case of DUMMY_CRISIS, whose value, however, is not 
significant. It can be noted that the adjusted R-squared has an explanatory value higher 
than the one recorded for the same case of the Big Three. By enriching the study with 
other variables, such as the combination of ratings in the critical area during the post-crisis 
period with ratings in the security area, and considering the same period, we found 
confirmation to our working hypothesis (2). As a result of the subprime mortgage crisis, the 
market proved to react less even to ratings issued by minor agencies, albeit with less 
intensity than their larger competitors. However, in the Non Big sub-sample the value is 
significant with a 5% only for the issuers in the security area. The negative sign for the 
border issuers, in contrast with what observed in the ratings issued by major CRAs, might 
be explained by a lower use in the certification activity of ratings issued by minor 
agencies. Proceeding the investigation with the third scenario, in which new independent 
variables have been added, the signs of the coefficients are in line with the expectations 
the expectations, but significance levels are acceptable for the DUMMY_WATCH and 
ANTICIP variables. 
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In the No Big sample, more than half of the issued ratings confirm the previous 
assessment. As they do not add new information, we decided to reiterate the analysis by 
restricting the sample to only those events that have led to a change in rating (4). The new 
combination of regressors manages to explain a higher value of extra-performance and 
highlights the less confidence of the market in minor CRAs in the post-crisis period. In fact, 
the BORDER_POSTCRISIS regressor shows a more accentuated negative coefficient 
than the one issued by the Big Three and with the same margin of error. The presence of 
a watch causes more accentuated changes in the extra-yield, as well as the absolute 
value of the rating change expressed in notches. 
 
Table 4 – Determinants of the ABS_CAR – Sample minor CRAs and all CRAs 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Entire 
Sample 
Entire 
Sample 
Entire 
Sample 
Sub-sample  
Dummy 
Stable=0 
CRAs Big  
& Nobig, 
Dummy 
Stable=0  
CRAs 
Big  
& Nobig  
CRAs Big 
& Nobig  
C 
-1,524  
(-2,419) 
-1,493  
(-2,326) 
-1,966 
(-2,67) 
-6,812  
(-3,287) 
-1,999           
(-1,799) 
-0,882  
(-1,552) 
-0,792    
(-1,517) 
DUMMY_CRISIS 
-1,748  
(-1,291) 
-1,353  
(-0,997) 
-1,729 
(-1,311) 
-2,870  
(-1,121) 
1,43  
 (1,28) 
1,741 
(1.84)* 
1,332   
(1,44) 
DUMMY  
POSTCRISIS 
-0,649** 
(-1,291)  
     
 
NOBORDER 
POSTCRISIS 
 
-0,672 ** 
(-2,329) 
-0,302 
(-0,378) 
-1,420**  
(-2,024) 
-1,30***   
(-3,167) 
-0,79***  
(-3,313) 
-1,223***   
(-3,742) 
BORDER  
POSTCRISIS 
 
-0,449  
(-1,043) 
-0,257  
(-0,537) 
-1,946***      
(-2,627) 
-0,376   
(-0,766) 
0,403 
(1,152) 
0,068  
(0,154) 
VIX 
0,104*** 
(2,6361) 
0,109*** 
(2,677) 
0,104** 
(2,378) 
0,226***  
(2,894) 
0,186***  
(4,866) 
0,177*** 
(5,799) 
0,191***  
(6,09) 
DEVST 
133,35*** 
(3,684) 
125,13*** 
(3,395) 
125,41*** 
(3,040) 
82,45* 
(1,772) 
18,47   
(1,025) 
1,71 
(0,107) 
2,78  
(0,192) 
VA CHANGE  
NOTCHES 
  
1,154 
(1,525) 
4,404** 
(2,327) 
2,462**  
(2,525) 
1,317** 
(2,30) 
 
CONTAMIN   
-0,334    
(-0,419) 
   
 
DUMMY    
2,762**   4,784** 2,231*** 1,375**  
1,476**  
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WATCH (2,375) (2,432) (2,847) (2,29) (2,446) 
DUMMY_ANTICIP   
-2,384**  
(-0,749) 
 
-0,043 
(-0,085) 
-0,258  
 (-0,503) 
0,241  
(0,496) 
DUMMY_BIG     
-1,576*** 
(-3,132) 
 
 
DUMMY S&P      
-1,31***   
(-2,842) 
 
DUMMY EJR       
1,129***  
(2,799) 
Adjusted R-squared 0,278 0,283 0,313 0,364 0,248 0,214 0,201 
N. observation 860 859 666 277 828 1220 1220 
The t-stat are reported in brackets under each coefficient. White heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and 
covariance. 
* = significant at 10% level; ** = significant at 5% level; ***= significant at 1% level with a two-tailed test.  
 
Finally, by combining the two samples and analyzing the ABS_CAR in light of the 
independent variables already considered, to which we add  the DUMMY_BIG variable, we 
can strengthen our conclusions that as a consequence of the subprime mortgages crisis, 
the market has lower confidence in the ratings issued by CRAs. The prices show lower 
returns especially where operators are not "forced" to act according to supervisory 
standards and regulations. In fact, the NOBORDER_POSTCRISIS variable appears with a 
high negative coefficient and with a margin of error inferior to 1%. Moreover, it seems that 
the reputational damage has a greater impact on major CRAs. In fact, the DUMMY_BIG 
coefficient is negative and highly significant under a statistical point of view.  
 
As a robustness check we also tested if the relation holds true when limiting the analysis to 
the agencies that were found to be more severe in their judgments, i.e. Standard and 
Poor‟s among the majors and EJR among the minors (see paragraph 3). The 
DUMMY_S&P variable displays a negative coefficient, notwithstanding the lower 
generosity of its ratings. This evidence further confirms the alleged loss of credibility 
suffered by the major agencies. On the contrary, the DUMMY_EJR variable has a positive 
and highly significant coefficient. The high impact of EJR‟s announcements on extra-
returns may also reflect the adoption of a subscriber-pay model and the consequent lower 
exposure to conflict of interests.  
 
In summary, both on the minor agencies‟ subsample and on the entire sample of rating 
announcements included in the analysis, we find evidence in line with previous literature 
for what concerns the variables traditionally included in this type of empirical work. We 
also find evidence supporting our thesis of a credibility loss suffered by the agencies in the 
post subprime crisis period, measured in terms of a lower market reaction to rating 
changes, all other factors being equal. The comparison between major and minor 
agencies highlights a stronger reputational damage for the former which were more deeply 
involved in the scandal.  
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6. Conclusions 
The results of the analysis confirm our hypothesis that the credibility of CRAs diminished 
after the subprime mortgage crisis. The impact of ratings actions on the prices of equity 
securities of financial intermediaries is lower in the post-crisis period, especially for those 
issuers with a high creditworthiness. Evidently, the informative role of CRAs is considered 
less important than it used to be, that is, the activity of rating agencies have a low 
informative value for this type of financial intermediaries. On the other hand, the prices of 
securities whose issuers have ratings previously defined as border, react to ratings actions 
even in the post-crisis period, probably due to the certification value of the rating. In fact, 
the sub-division of the sample, depending on whether the rating action comes from one of 
the three major agencies or from minor agencies, showed a different impact on the prices 
of securities called "border". In the first sub-sample, the extra-yield cumulated in the post-
crisis period reacts more because of regulatory obligations, which generally refer to the 
evaluations expressed by larger agencies, although the effect is not significant. On the 
other hand, in the sample of ratings issued by minor CRAs, price variation is always limited 
in the post-crisis period. Even when rating confirmations have been excluded, the negative 
sign of the “border” shows a modest informative value, not being counterbalanced by the 
regulatory role of minor CRAs. 
 
The evidence shown in the paper is in line with previous literature on the topic. To this 
literature we add our contribution focused on the reputational damage suffered by rating 
agencies as a consequence of the subprime crisis. The overall analysis of the ratings 
actions confirms a loss of credibility of the agencies, in particular, for those most involved 
in the financial crisis after the Lehman bankruptcy. The comparison between major and 
minor agencies enriches the analysis by highlighting a general mistrust towards rating 
industry, alongside a greater loss of credibility suffered by the major players. This 
conclusion is particularly strengthen by the comparison between two agencies adopting 
very different organizational models, Standard & Poor's and EJR. In fact, the analysis 
identifies opposite reactions of the market: lower in the first case and higher for the second 
agency. 
 
Considering that in the future the regulatory role of CRAs will become increasingly limited, 
it will be necessary to verify if the loss of credibility will be recovered, thanks also to new 
regulatory measures and to the encouraged increased competition. As a future line of 
research, it will be interesting to test if the rating industry will be able to regain investors‟ 
trust thanks to these regulatory news. 
 
A potential weakness of the analysis lays in the lack of a variable measuring the distance 
between each rating new rating valuation issued and the average outstanding valuations 
by other agencies on the same issuer. This measure could be read as a proxy of the 
“information value” contained in the announcement. However, the inclusion of such an 
indicator in the current work would have reduced too much the sample of valid 
observations, since it would be applicable exclusively to issuers covered by more than one 
agencies in each period. Thus, a further increase in the sample would be needed in order 
to include this regressor.  
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Endnotes 
                                               
 
i
 Paragraphs 1, 2, 4 and 5.1 are written by Paola De Vincentiis. Paragraphs 3, 5.2 and 6 are written by 
Patrizia Pia. 
ii This paper is part of a larger research project undertaken by a research group of the University of Torino. 
Using a similar methodology and with the same research question, a different sample of rating actions 
concerning banks and non-financial companies belonging to the Euro Stoxx 50, Usa Stoxx and Asia-Pacific 
Stoxx was analyzed. The paper Damilano, Isaia, Rovera (2014) presents the results of the analysis, focusing 
in particular on the weight of geographical and sectorial cross-sectional differences. 
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